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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses one of the most fundamental, but least consid-
ered, questions in housing research: how should we ultimately evalu-
ate housing outcomes? Rejecting the fact vs value dichotomy so
dominant in the social sciences, this paper draws on the work of
Amartya Sen and Hilary Putnam to critically assess the ethical assump-
tions behind three commonly adopted “informational spaces” for
evaluating housing outcomes: economic, subjective and “objective”
metrics. It argues that all three fail to account for the plurality of goods
that individuals have reason to value and the fallibility of human
judgement. As an alternative, it proposes that housing outcomes
should be ultimately evaluated in terms of people’s “housing capabil-
ities” - the effective freedoms that people have in their homes and
neighbourhoods to do and feel the things they have reason to value –
which should generally be determined through a bottom-up process
of democratic deliberation involving critical and expert perspectives.
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Introduction
Whether we consider instances of housing policy/practice to represent progress or
not depends upon how we define “success”, an intensely value-base judgement. Take
Housing Market Renewal as an example. Between 2002–2011, UK central government
spent £2.2 billion pounds and demolished 10,000 houses in an attempt to renew
failing housing markets in the North of England (Wilson 2013). Was the programme
a success? Well, it depends on how we define “success”. The evaluative framework
used by the government was dominated by two metrics – house prices and vacancy
rates – and based on these, the project arguably represented progress1. However, it
is highly questionable whether this was an ethically reasonable evaluative framework
in the first place. For one thing, the framework did not consider the financial well-
being of renters and aspiring home-owners who would, if anything, have suffered
from increased house prices (or associated rents). Nor did it consider the financial
well-being of those owners whose homes were demolished, who faced a £35,000
average shortfall between the compensation received and the cost of a suitable
alternative property (Cole and Flint 2007).
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Besides judging the success of a regeneration initiative or policy intervention, the
evaluation of housing outcomes takes place at a national scale through the periodic
monitoring of affordability metrics and homelessness statistics, and at an organizational
scale through the use of “key performance indicators” (KPI’s) and social impact measure-
ment (Wilkes and Mullins 2012). We must also adopt a particular definition of housing
justice or progress when evaluating levels of housing (in)equality. Some, if not most, of us
would consider inequality in housing outcomes a matter of injustice2, but inequality of
what (Sen 1980)? Inequality of housing costs? Inequality of social, economic and cultural
capital? Similarly, if we are to identify instances of housing poverty or deprivation, we
must also ask “deprivation or poverty of what?” There is no commonly accepted definition
but housing deprivation is commonly viewed through the lens of physical housing
conditions (e.g. Decent Homes Standard, Over-crowding) and affordability.
All of the instances above require us to decide upon an evaluative framework for defining
progress. But what type of metric(s) or informational space should we use? And who
decides? Drawing largely on the work of Amartya Sen and Hilary Putnam, this paper
addresses the normative question of howwe should ultimately evaluate housing outcomes.
The next section starts by laying out the epistemological foundations of the paper, arguing
for “classical realist” approach which is both anti-foundationalist and anti-relativist. Section
three then critically assesses three commonly adopted “informational spaces” for evaluating
housing outcomes – economic, subjective and “objective” – tracing their philosophical
roots, and reviewing ethical arguments for and against each in the context of housing.
Section four then proposes that housing outcomes should be ultimately evaluated in terms
of people’s “housing capabilities”which should generally be determined through a bottom-
up process of democratic deliberation. The final section concludes.
Speaking Ethically (And epistemologically)
In discussions of housing policy (at HSA, ENHR, etc.), it would be unsurprising to hear
someone challenge a statement, not by saying that the statement in question is false, or
the arguments offered in its favour are not good ones, but by asking in a certain tone of
voice, “Is that supposed to be a fact or a value judgment?”. The implication being that if it
is a value judgement then it is simply “subjective”, and a further implication being that if it
is “subjective” then “my value judgments are just as good as yours” – that is, the whole
notion of better and worse reasons, not to say correctness and incorrectness, does not
apply. In this scenario – adapted from Hilary Putnam (2003) – facts are posited as being
objectively true and capable of being objectively warranted, in direct opposition to values
which are purely subjective and therefore lie outside the sphere of reason.
This dichotomy between fact and value has been hugely influential in the social
sciences, yielding a whole set of accompanying dichotomies; between objective vs
subjective, positive vs normative economics and descriptive vs prescriptive analysis.
Hilary Putnam (2002) traces the roots of the fact vs. value dichotomy back to the logical
positivists but more recently, Milton Friedman, took great pride in the objectivity of
positive economics, “Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular
ethical position or normative judgments. [. . . It] is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in
precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences”. (Friedman 1953, 4)”. And
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although most economists today have moved on from logical posivitism, the fact/value
dichotomy still underlies their beliefs and intended practice (Walsh 2003).
“Value-neutrality” is also prized by those policymakers, practitioners and consultants
involved in evaluation, who are encouraged to remove themselves from ethical debates
by viewing the policymaking process as two distinct stages: first, the democratically
elected politician makes the value-based judgement of what the objectives of
a programme or policy should be; second, the evaluator (be it an academic or research
consultant) factually records the extent to which these objectives have been fulfilled.
The problem with such a distinction, however, is that fact and value judgements are
inherently entangled. As Kemeny (1984), Sen (2009), Putnam (2002, 2003) and countless
others have demonstrated, value-based judgements pervade positive economics and the
evaluation of housing outcomes more generally. They are there in the use of “thick ethical
concepts” (Williams 1985) like “affordable”, “appropriate”, ”efficient”, “optimal” and “uti-
lity” which all contain both a factual and normative component (when we say that
housing is “unaffordable”, we are essentially saying that people cannot afford
a “reasonable” standard of housing on a “reasonable” proportion of their income where,
in both cases, defining “reasonable” relies on a value judgement). They are there in the
recommendation or disapproval of particular polices (such as increasing housing supply)
or the (implicit) endorsement of particular evaluative metrics such as life satisfaction, the
30:40 affordability ratio or GDP per capita. Even the choice of p-value involves an
epistemic value-based judgement that involves weighing up the risk of type one and
type two errors (Reiss 2017).
None of the above will be new to readers of this journal. Social constructionists like
Jacobs and Manzi (2000), Kemeny (1984), and Clapham (1997) have been making this
argument for decades, demonstrating, for example, how the value-based judgements
that lie behind housing research, policy and practice are shaped by power-structures, with
neo-liberal housing regimes advancing consumerist values at the expense of equality and
sustainability (Clapham 2018, Chapter 11). Thus, it would be remiss to say that values have
not been discussed in housing research. They have.
However, after pointing out that values are unavoidable in housing research, social
constructionists consistently stop short of discussing which values housing policy, practice
and research ought to advance. This leads to an incidental and unholy alliance against
normative reasoning between positivists and social constructionists, both of whom hold (or
at least don’t argue against) the view that because value-based judgements are subjective, it
is not possible to say that one value-based judgement is more reasonable than another. Bo
Bengtsson noted the absence of normative reasoning in 1995 (1995: 123),
“Markets and politics are in the centre of most normative discussions on housing
policy. They are also the focus of housing research. Consequently, one would expect
housing researchers to have important things to say in policy matters. Nevertheless, when
it comes to normative conclusions some housing researcher turn mute, while other
candidly declare their personal position. It is sometimes amazing how social scientists,
who would feel obliged to justify, page after page, the slightest methodological irregu-
larity, seem to find it impossible to argue on normative matters in scientific terms.”
And there is nothing to suggest that anything has changed in the intervening 25 years.
As Fitzpatrick and Watts (2018, 225) recently noted,
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“With some notable exceptions, there is scant theoretical attention paid to these
‘ought’ questions in housing studies, with unexamined values embedded more or less
across the board in a largely taken-for-granted fashion. . .. Where normative issues are
overtly addressed it is generally in a fairly shallow and unsophisticated manner”
Faith in the Power of Reason
If we are to reason about values – as this paper seeks to do – then we need an alternative
epistemology that accounts for the position-dependency of all value-based judgements
without lapsing into the strong moral relativism of social constructionism which holds
that one statement can never be more valid than another. It is here that we turn to the
thinking of the Hilary Putnam and Amartya Sen, who although coming from different
philosophical tradition – Sen associated with a value-pluralist critique of neo-classical
economics and Putnam associated with the classical pragmatism of John Dewey – both
occupy positions which are largely complementary, dovetailing at various points (e.g.
Walsh 2003; Putnam 2002, 2008; Sen 2005).
Following other social constructionists and anti-foundationalists, both accept that it is
simply impossible to look at the world independently of where we stand (Putnam in
Nussbaum and Sen 1993, 148; Sen 2009, 156) leading them to dismiss the possibility of
achieving essentialist or transcendentalist “theories” of truth, knowledge or justice. For
the anti-foundationalist philosophers such as Foucault, Rorty and Derrida, once we
recognize this, we have no choice but relativism. For them, metaphysical realism repre-
sents vital foundations for our beliefs about the world and its contents (Putnam 1990, 20),
and without these “foundations”, there is no way of saying that one normative (or factual)
statement is more valid than another. Channelling the relativism of Foucault (1994), Chris
Allen (2008, 197) therefore rejected the call to propose an alternative course of action
when criticizing Housing Market Renewal, arguing that “those who work in the sphere of
thought should not be obliged to come up with ‘practical alternatives’”.
Not so for Putnam and Sen. They dismiss the significance of metaphysical realism,
arguing that to discuss ethics in terms of ontology is deeply misguided (Sen 2009, 41). “To
identify that metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language” (Putnam 1992, 124)
argues “is to give metaphysics an altogether exaggerated importance”. More than mis-
guided, it is positively dangerous for academia to vacate the realm of reasoned (norma-
tive) debate on ontological grounds and leave it open to “post-truth” demagogues like
Erdogan and Trump. “The view that all the left has to do is tear down what is, and not
discuss what might replace it” as Putnam ([1992] 1995, 130) goes on “is the most
dangerous politics of all, and one that could easily be borrowed by the extreme right”.
For Putnam and Sen, the aim of philosophy in general, and ethics in particular, should
not be infallibility or a set of eternal, idealized, abstract theoretical truths – as both the
foundationalists and relativists assumed – but the progression of practical problems
which are situated in particular contexts. In place of “metaphysical realist” understandings
of objectivity, Putnam and Sen both argue in favour of a classical realist “common sense”
position which understands “objectivity” to be linked to the ability to survive challenges
from informed scrutiny coming from diverse quarters (Sen 2009, 45). Amartya Sen’s idea
of (trans-) positional objectivity (Sen, 1993), for example, holds that if people from a range
of social positions all agree upon a particular statement – such as “homelessness is
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unjust”- then we can consider that statement to be “trans-positionally objective”. This is
not a metaphysical “rule” – there are undoubtedly times in history after all when an
argument has turned out to be right despite being advanced by only a “crazed” minority,
even a broken clock is right twice a day – but a fallible rule of thumb derived from
historical experience. Shorn of any metaphysical proof, Sen and Putnam both rely on “a
sort of cultivated naivete´” (Putnam 1994, 283), or democratic faith in the power of reason
and the possibility of progress, as Hilary Putnam (2008, 387) summarizes;
What Deweyans possess is the ‘democratic faith’ that if we discuss things in a democratic
manner, if we inquire carefully and if we test our proposals in an experimental spirit, and if we
discuss the proposals and their tests thoroughly, then even if our conclusions will not always
be right, nor always justified, nor always even reasonable – we are only human, after all – still,
we shall be right, we will be justified, we will be reasonable more often than if we relied on
any foundational philosophical theory, and certainly more often that if we relied on any
dogma, or any method fixed in advance of inquiry and held immune from revision in the
course of inquiry.
The implications of adopting this classical realist position for the remainder of the paper
are not especially radical. Once we recognize that there is no metaphysical difference
between fact and value and therefore no methodological difference between morality
and science (Putnam 2017, Chapter 4), it simply means that we should subject value-
based normative debates to the same (self-)critical reasoning as we would do when
deliberating the causes of housing unaffordability or the drivers of homelessness.
Three Frameworks for Evaluating Housing Outcomes
Broadly speaking, there are three types of metric most commonly used to evaluate
housing outcomes: economic metrics which are rooted in welfarism; subjective metrics
derived from utilitarianism which require the subject themselves to judge their own well-
being; and “objective” or “expert-defined” metrics which judge an individual’s housing
outcomes according to some uniform, commonly agreed standard. Example of these
three metrics is given below.
Type of Evaluative Framework Example Metrics
Economic House prices, Rents, Affordability ratios, Level of subsidy
“Objective”: how does the evaluator judge
a person’s housing outcomes?
Rooms per person, Decent Homes Standard, Numbers of
homelessness, Number of homes built
Subjective: how does the resident judge their
housing outcomes?
Life Satisfaction, Customer Satisfaction, Satisfaction with
regeneration initiative or programme
Most housing policy and practice evaluations do not rely on only one form of metric.
For example, the two main metrics used to evaluate Housing Market renewal were
“objective” (vacancy rates) and economic (house prices) (Leather and Cole 2009), and
other regeneration scheme evaluations, such as that of Rayner’s Lane in London, have
also included subjective metrics (Provan, Belotti, and Power 2016). Below, I briefly
review the ethical arguments for and against each of these metrics before returning
to Putnam and Sen to see what they have to say about how we should evaluate housing
outcomes.
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Economic Metrics and Welfarism
We can think of two types of value-based judgements in relation to economic metrics.
First, there is the choice between different economic metric. Choosing one economic
metric over another inevitably involves a value-based judgement about whose economic
welfare to prioritize. If we use house prices as a positive evaluative metric (as in HMR, for
instance), then we are clearly prioritizing the economic welfare of home-owners over
renters as, for the latter, house price growth is likely to equate to higher rents and/or
greater difficulty in achieving home-ownership.
Then, there are the ethical arguments for and against using economic metrics in
general. On the plus-side, economic measures respect individual freedom to choose,
and although economic wealth is not a good in itself, it tends to translate into other
goods. If housing costs are more affordable relative to income, then individuals are less
likely to experience housing stress (Meen 2018), and will be in a stronger position to
demand greater security of tenure, and greater control over their homes.
However, economic metrics also have major ethical limitations. To appreciate these, it
is perhaps worth briefly remembering their utilitarian foundation. Historically, the debate
amongst economists has been about how best to measure happiness rather than about
whether happiness is the only thing that matters. For the founders of modern economics
(e.g. Francis Edgeworth, W.S. Jevons, Jeremy Bentham) the ultimate goal was to measure
happiness directly. However, economists gradually departed from this aim, and placed
increasing faith in choice behaviour (or “revealed preferences”) as a proxy for happiness
(Read 2007).
According to welfarism (Sen 1979), the fundamental value of anything is equivalent
only to what people are willing to pay for it. If people are willing to pay an extra £1000 per
annum to increase their lifespan by 6 months (through, for instance, paying for better
healthcare), and they are also willing to spend an extra £1000 per annum for a spare room,
then both of these goods are of equivalent value (See Cheshire 2018 for example of this
logic). The value of something, indeed, anything, is equivalent only to the happiness it
brings, which in turn, is equivalent what people are willing to pay for it.
However, there are a number of factual and ethical weaknesses with the logic posited
above. The major factual weakness is that improvements in economic metrics – and by
extension, the satisfaction of individual preferences – does not always lead to an increase
in happiness. Individuals adapt to the improvement in living conditions (e.g. Nakazato,
Schimmack, and Oishi 2011), and judge their living conditions relative those people
around them (their “reference group”) (e.g. Bellet 2017). Thus, the relationship between
economic resources and happiness will vary between social groups; a two-bedroom
house containing five family members is likely to be a source of shame in the UK but
the same house may afford prestige in some developing countries.
The relationship between economic resources and happiness will also vary according
to mental and physical health: an individual with severe physical disabilities is likely to
needmuchmore expensive housing than someone who is fully able to achieve equivalent
levels of subjective well-being. In Sen’s terms, different individuals and societies have
different “conversion factors” for turning resources into well-being (Sen 1992, 19–21,
26–30, 37–38). And, as the early economists recognized (Read 2007), the conversion
rate will also vary according to one’s income level. An extra pound is going to bring
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more happiness to someone earning minimum wage than to a millionaire as income has
a diminishing effect on happiness (Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008).
Subjective Metrics and Utilitarianism
Partly due to limitations of economic metrics stated above, there has been something of
a shift back to Bentham’s ideal of measuring happiness directly. “Customer satisfaction” is
one of the key indicators used to evaluate the performance of UK Housing Associations
in the Sector Scorecard,3 and subjective judgements about financial stress have been
used to inform the development of economic affordability metrics (Meen 2018).
Moreover, the UK Treasury’s 2018 “Green Book”, the “rulebook” of UK policy evaluation,
explicitly states that economic appraisal should be based on the utilitarian principles of
welfare economics (Treasury, H. M. S., 2018: line 2.3), prioritizing economic and subjective
well-being metrics.
In one sense, subjective well-being is a more appropriate informational space to evaluate
housing outcomes, as happiness is something which people value in itself, as opposed to
money which only has instrumental value. However, people have good reason to value
other things than happiness. Most of us would condemn racist social housing allocation
policies regardless of their effect on societal well-being. Subjective and economic indicators,
both rooted in utilitarianism, are ethically deprived because they fail to recognize that
certain things can be morally right or wrong, regardless of their effects on “utility”.
The secondmajor ethical limitation of focussing on subjective metrics when evaluating
housing outcomes is that we privilege those with high expectations at the expense of
those with low expectations. Peoples’ preferences and what they judge to be the
necessities of life depend on what they, and those people around them, have experienced
in the past (see Nakazota et al., 2011; Bellet 2017). Figure 1 below, for example, shows that
almost half of the people whose homes failed the Space Standard in 20084 rated the size
of their living space “very good” or “fairly good”. Deprived persons’ housing expectations
can be stymied by powerful interests, meaning that instead of rebelling against injustice,
they may lie down and accept their lot. Take this older ex-homeless man who was asked
how he felt about only being offered a 5-year fixed term tenancy instead of a lifetime
tenancy (which is the norm with social housing in the UK),
I didn’t really take that much notice to tell the truth, because it was – like I said, I was so
grateful to have a roof over my head, especially after being there [hostel] so long . . . I didn’t
really think that much of it because knowing that I needed a roof over my head I just
accepted, right, what was on the plate as such. (Fitzpatrick and Watts 2017, 1031)
“Objective” (Or “Expert-defined”) Metrics and Objective List Theories
Many of the ethical limitations of subjective metrics can be addressed through the use of
objective5 metrics such as rooms per person, and the Decent Homes Standard. Objective
metrics are too heterogenous to be associated with one particular theory of justice, but they
are probably most closely related to Aristotelian objective-list theories of well-being which
specify goods, actions, or freedoms which universally constitute the good life (Rice 2013).
By using a commonly agreed standard of measurement, objective metrics avoid the
problem of adaptive preferences as everyone’s housing conditions are measured on the
same scale.
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Objective metrics also allow for us to classify certain polices as unjust, regardless of
their consequences: we can rank different local authorities on the inclusiveness of their
allocation policies, and we can judge unhealthy living conditions to be inadequate even if
the tenant is satisfied with them as a result of having known nothing better.
However, by taking the power of judgement away from individual citizens, and con-
centrating it in the hands of the evaluator or regulator, we run the very serious risk of
undue paternalism: that the organization doing the evaluating will impose their vision of
the good life onto the organization or citizens who may have an entirely reasonable but
rivalling conception of the good life. A prime example of this relates to over-crowding.
The ethnographer, Pader (1994, 2002) has demonstrated how overcrowding regulations
in the USA have been used to impose a Western-centric view of how space should be used
on immigrant populations. This is vividly illustrated in the following quotation from
a housing attorney interviewed by Pader (2002, 301);
I never really thought about how I lived until I was an attorney working city cases where the
state was moving to take kids away from their families. One case had a very young social
worker, 24, and she was just outraged that a grandmother was sleeping in the same room
with her grandchild. [The social worker] said it’s “inappropriate and we have to intervene in
this family and take this child out. How could you have two generations . . . sleeping in the
same bedroom . . . It’s totally inappropriate.
If a family’s economic circumstances leave them with no choice but to share a room, then
that is arguably amatter of injustice. But in some cultures, people reject the option of having
a separate bedroom because they value spatial proximity or “skinship” over privacy. As
a Mexican woman who moved to Los Angeles in the late 1940s said to Pader (1993, 129),
0
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35
40
very good fairly good neither good nor
poor
fairly poor very poor
Figure 1. Subjective rating of size of living space for those who fail the national space standard (N = 329).
Source: English Housing Survey, 2008
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We do things differently. They don’t understand that we all share rooms, that it’s better for
the children to learn to share and not just think about themselves. I see so many Americans
living on their own, and I think how lonely they must be.
A More Reasonable Framework for Evaluating Housing Outcomes?
Returning to the perspective of Sen and Putnam, we can see that all of the ethical flaws
discussed above with welfarism, utilitarianism and objective list-theories are rooted in the
same failure to recognize the position-dependency and fallibility of human judgement.
In the same way that the logical positivists claimed to have an objective “view from
nowhere” when describing and understanding the world, so these universalist “theories”
of justice presuppose a uniformity of principles upon which all “rational” persons can
agree. Welfarism, utilitarianism and objective list theories all share a “monological” form of
moral reasoning which proceeds from the standpoint of the “rational” person, defined in
such a way that differences among concrete selves become quite irrelevant (Benhabib
1986, 300). For the neo-classical economist, every “rational” person should agree that
justice equates to economic resources; for the utilitarian, the “irrational” person is one
who acts against their own subjective well-being out of a sense of duty, and for the social
worker in Pader (2002) it was objectively wrong for a granddaughter to share a room with
her grandmother. These rationalist theories of justice – welfarism, utilitarianism, objective
list theories – are all built on the assumption that the moral philosopher has been able to
access some higher form of reasoning, some objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986),
that “irrational” others who disagree have not yet reached.
In their search for a universal, reductive formula of justice, these rationalist theories
belie the irreducible plurality of goods and the conflict and uncertainty that is inherent in
the pursuit of progress. Different people value, and have reason to value, different goods
and often these goods conflict. Society may have good reason to prioritize the capability
to have an extra year’s life expectancy over the capability to have a spare room, even if the
willingness to pay metrics suggest both are of equal value.
Putnam and Sen, by contrast, adopt a more open, and pluralist stance, which has been
most concretely manifested in the form of the capabilities approach. Advanced most
notably by Amartya Sen (e.g. Sen 2009) and Martha Nussbaum (e.g. Nussbaum 2011), and
endorsed by Putnam (2002, 2008), the core claim of the capability approach is that
judgements about justice or equality, or the level of development of a community or
country, should focus ultimately on the effective opportunities that people have to lead
the lives they have reason to value – their capabilities.
A key virtue of the capabilities approach is that it accounts for the plurality of goods
which individuals have reason to value, including both means and ends (or “agency” and
“well-being” in the conceptual terms of Sen 1985). It accounts for the intrinsic importance of
happiness, as having the effective freedom to do the things that one has reason to value will
generally enhance one’s happiness. But, by allowing people to decide upon the effectives
freedoms they value, it also accounts for the fact that certain freedoms can be reasonably
considered right or wrong regardless of their consequences. It allows for the fact that
someone may want, in principle, to remain near their mother with severe dementia, even
if neither party is any happier or economically better-off for it (subjective metrics and
economic metrics, in contrast, would consider such a state of affairs as sub-optimal). It
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allows for the fact that not everyone wants a home that meets the Decent Homes Standard,
and that some people are quite content with having a house that is technically over-
crowded (some objective metrics would see both as obstacles to progress).
By focussing on people’s effective opportunities to do things rather than whether they
do them or not, the capabilities approach also accounts for the fallibility of decision-
makers and evaluators, thus guarding against undue paternalism. Whereas an “objective”
metric focussing on human functionings might consider an adolescent to be impover-
ished if they shared a bedroom, the capabilities approach would only consider them
impoverished if they did not have the “effective freedom” to a room of their own.
The emphasis on “effective” freedoms is also crucial. A common argument used by
libertarians to justify dire market outcomes is that because the individual “chose” to live in
a room without windows, or “chose” to work on a zero-hours contract, that outcome
should be considered just because it resulted from a voluntarily market transaction
between a willing buyer and willing seller. For the capabilities approach, however, it is
not sufficient that the transaction was voluntary, both transacting agents must also have
had a “sufficiently” wide range of options (or “capabilites”) to choose from for that
transaction to be considered just (Varoufakis 2002–2003).
Despite its ethical merits, there have been few attempts to actually evaluate housing
outcomes using capabilities as the primary informational space (Clapham, Foye, and
Christian 2018), although there has been a recent uptick (Haffner and Elsinga 2019;
Tanekenov, Fitzpatrick, and Johnsen 2018). This neglect maybe borne partly out of
ignorance, but the impracticality of the capabilities approach must also be a significant
factor (Robeyns 2006). It can be extremely difficult to measure an individual’s effective
freedoms, as you must measure all the options potentially open to an individual.
Ascertaining whether someone would have access to an adequately sized home if they
wanted is much more difficult than calculating the number of rooms per person. For this
reason, researchers attempting to measure capabilities on a large-scale basis often just
end upmeasuring functionings (see Coates, Anand, and Norris 2013 for an example of this
applied to housing).
It is also unclear the extent to which the capabilities approach can capture the nuance,
subtlety and passivity that characterizes people’s relationships with their home. The
capabilities approach works well for substantive freedoms that can be discretely sepa-
rated out and defined – the freedom to green space or cook one’s meals or to have a spare
bedroom – but there are a lot of senses and feelings that people value from home such as
“homeliness”, “security” and “the ability to be themselves” which cannot be neatly
“pigeon-holed and padlocked” into “effective freedoms”. As Peter King (2017, 18) argues;
“Housing does not actively engage us. It settles us, calms us, hides us and teaches us
not to worry about what is outside. Housing works best when we do not notice our need
of it. Housing is fulfilment and so the creation of complacency”
This chimes with G.A. Cohen’s critique of the capabilities approach for espousing an all
too `athletic’ image of the human deriving happiness only from what they can do (Cohen
1993, 24±5), and ignoring the many passive ways in which humans derive happiness. In
light of the above, there may be a good reason to expand the definition of capabilities in
the context of housing to encompass “the effective freedoms that people have in their
homes and neighbourhoods to do and feel the things they have reason to value.”
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When it comes to the process of developing a list of capabilities, Sen and Putnam
(following Dewey) both make an “epistemological defense of democracy”. Because every
observation is made through one’s own particular lens, and is therefore fallible, it is wrong
for evaluators to presuppose that every rational person should think the sameway, or values
the same capabilities, as them. For a set of capabilities to adequately reflect the diversity of
values – or to be “positionally-objective” – it needs to be developed from the bottom-up;
immersed rather than detached from the community in question (Nussbaum and Sen
1987, 308).
The epistemological defence of democracy is particularly valid when applied to value
judgements as these are inherently “perspectival” in a way that factual judgements are
not (Anderson 2003). It makes sense for a neighbourhood to be perceived as down-
trodden and derelict by one group of people, but homely and secure by another. It does
not, however, make sense for one group to say that “2 + 2 = 5” and another group to say
“2 + 2 = 6”. Moreover, those value-based judgements derived from ascriptive identities –
such as prioritizing “local people” when allocating social housing – are necessarily
perspectival since they are defined through contrast with outgroups (Anderson 2003).
Whilst giving weight to the everyday knowledge of the citizen, we should not consider
their preferences and values to be sacred. Individuals and communities can be unreason-
able, holding viewswhich are stubbornly racist, sexist, selfish, xenophobic, homophobic and
intolerant of others, their opinions structured by the currents of power which shape and
distort housing preferences (e.g. Gurney 1999) and reasoning processes (e.g. Flyvberg 1998).
Sen has been elusive in specifying an ideal process for deciding capabilities but if we
bring together his thinking, we can start to picture a process that resembles deliberative
democracy (Crocher, 2006). Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that
legitimate law-making issues from the public deliberation of citizens (Bohman and Rehg in
Bohman, 1997). Whereas representative or direct democracy gets people to express their
values simply through voting (for example, on whether to regenerate an estate or not);
deliberative democracy gets people to explain and justify their point of view to others,
especially those with conflicting viewpoints. Whereas direct democracy takes people’s
opinions and values as given, deliberative democracy gets people to critically reflect on
their values in recognition that all individuals are capable of being unreasonable, and will
therefore benefit from being exposed to external critical perspectives. Deliberative democ-
racy recognizes the inherently political and fallible nature of collective decision-making,
emphasizing the ability of individuals to reason with each other, find common ground, or
agree to disagree in which case decisions are typically made through a majority vote.
As well as engaging with diverse perspectives, deliberation may also involve experiencing
different environments. For someone living in a poorly lit, and ill-proportioned home, it may
require them to experience a well-designed home to realize what physical aspects of their
built environment they value most. The UK charity “Local Trust” (https://localtrust.org.uk/)
commonly uses the experience of different built environments to stimulate deliberation.
Rather than getting an urban designer to say “but what about density and air pollution” they
take a community to see a high street with lots of well-designed spaces that is used by
“people like them”. All of these instances can be broadly understood as forms of deliberation.
Shelter’s Living Home Standard6 (2016) is perhaps the most ambitious attempt to
develop a framework for evaluating housing outcomes through bottom-up deliberative
democracy. Drawing heavily on the philosophy of JRF’s minimum income standard
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(Bramley and Bailey 2018), the Standard was “the first definition of what home means that
has been defined by the public, for the public”. The process was democratic, starting from
the bottom-up and asking residents what they value about home and neighbourhood, and
also deliberative: the idea wasn’t to produce a long wishlist of housing attributes, incorpor-
ating and aggregating everyone’s preferences, but to draw people towards a common
view about what an acceptable home would look like. Findings from other citizen juries
suggest that participants are open-minded, willing to engage and change their mind, and
prepared to take the process seriously, providing recommendations that can be realistically
implemented7, and this was true of the final Living Home Standard which was ambitious
without being unrealistic (according to a survey, 58% of homes in the UK met it).
Although it starts from the bottom-up, a deliberative democracy does not preclude
a role for experts. “In a deliberative democracy, learning how to think for oneself, to
question, to criticize, is fundamental” but as Putnam (2001, 25) notes, “thinking for oneself
does not exclude – indeed it requires – learning when and where to seek expert knowl-
edge”. We all have informational blind spots. Despite looking fine, new-build housing may
in fact be environmentally unsustainable, of poor quality or structurally unsound. An area
that feels dangerous to local people may, according to the data, be relatively crime-free.
By providing citizens with evidence and making them more aware of the effect that
housing (policy) has on the effective freedoms and feelings that they value, experts can
improve the informational base upon which capabilities are decided. Juries are perfectly
capable of grappling with complex research, given time, patience, and empathetic expert
witnesses (Breckon, Hopkins, and Rickey 2019)
That said, even if we develop a set of capabilities from the bottom-up and involve the
perspectives of critics and experts, there still is no “metaphysical rule” saying that the
resulting evaluating framework will be reasonable. Power distorts all reasoning processes,
and any democratic approach, including deliberative ones, remains susceptible to
a “tyranny of the majority” hijacking the process to advance their own interests. For this
reason, the state should reserve the right to intervene on behalf of minorities if they have
been unreasonably excluded or subjugated. Indeed, it is notable that although Sen
refuses to endorse Nussbaum’s list of 10 capabilities (for reasons stated in Sen 2004), he
has implicitly argued that being healthy, well-nourished and educated are universal basic
capabilities that no person can be reasonably denied (Anand and Sen 2000, 85).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the examination and evaluation of housing outcomes
require us to make value-based, as well as factual, judgements. Unfortunately, most of the
social scientific literature to date has responded to this entanglement of fact and value by
side-lining normative reasoning, with both neoclassical economists and social construc-
tionists arguing that value-based judgements are subjective and therefore beyond the
realm of reason. The divorce between positive and normative has been damaging for
both sides. On the one side, it has severely stunted social scientists’ understanding of
normative thought, and arguably eroded our ability to engage in normative reasoning. On
the other side, it has led philosophy to become overly abstracted from concrete social
practice (Olson and Sayer 2009). As both sides grow further apart, engagement with each
other becomes harder to countenance.
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I have drawn on the work of Sen and Putnam to argue that although all value
judgements are position-dependent, some are more reasonable than others and the
best way of discriminating between them is generally through a bottom-up process of
deliberative democratic reasoning which focusses on maximizing people’s housing cap-
abilities: the effective freedoms that people have in their homes and neighbourhoods to
do and feel the things they have reason to value.
While arguing that housing capabilities represented the best “information space” for
evaluating housing outcomes, I also recognized that, in practice, it is difficult to operationalize.
Therefore, it is reasonable that evaluators use subjective, objective and economic indicators as
proxies for housing capabilities. If the vast majority of people value more living space, then it
would seem reasonable to use objective metrics of overcrowding as metric of progress,
provided we remember that it is the underlying capability to have an adequate level of living
space that is important. Likewise, if the vast majority of people value being happy, then we
could use subjective well-being indicators (such as life satisfaction) as metrics of progress,
providedwe remember that people have good reason to value freedoms that are detrimental
to their happiness.
Shelter’s Living Home Standard is the closest thing that I know to a set a of housing
capabilities developed through deliberative democracy, and it would useful if this were
incorporated into the English Housing Survey (and UK equivalents), so that evaluators can
track the attributes of home that citizens actually value. This would then allow researchers and
policymakers to ground different housing concepts and standards such as housing-inequality,
affordability, overcrowding and the Decent Homes Standard in the deliberative reasoning of
citizens.
Future research could also explore the extent to which the effective freedoms
people value from home vary by location, nationality, age, gender, ethnicity, class;
and examine how bottom-up deliberative democratic forums, and “democratic inno-
vations” (Elstub and Escobar 2017) can reconcile conflicting values and enable society
to muddle through local problems such as disagreement between residents and
housing association practitioners over regeneration projects or social housing alloca-
tions policies, and national problems such as land-value capture. In all the above, it is
essential that we understand the role that power has to play in shaping values,
discourses and negotiation – and the ways which power imbalances can be
addressed so that the better reason may prevail.
The argument summarized above also has some broader implications for housing
studies as a discipline. For one thing, the entanglement of fact and value implies that
we should be more relaxed about using those “thick ethical concepts” like “impo-
verished” or “humiliating” (Williams 1985) which contain a value, as well as factual,
component. If “description” involves choosing from a set of possibly true statements
on the grounds of their relevance (as Sen 1980 posited), then one of these grounds
may reasonably relate to ethical concerns. For another, it implies that the role of
(housing) philosophy is not to discover an eternal and universal theory of justice, but
to test the moral intuition of citizens and probe for logical inconsistencies or, as Isiah
Berlin (1978, 11) put it “to assist men to understand themselves and thus operate in
the open, and not wildly, in the dark”
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Notes
1. As Peter Housden, then Permanent Secretary of CLG put it, “on its two key indicators –
vacancy rates and the relation to regional house prices – the pathfinder areas are demon-
strably succeeding in their objectives”. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,
2008, Housing Market Renewal: Pathways. Available online at; https://publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmpubacc/106/106.pdf.
2. For example, ideas of moral equality are present in the Jerusalem-based religions which span
much of the world’s population (Putnam 1987: 60–61).
3. www.sectorscorecard.com.
4. 2008 is the most recent year that respondents were asked this question.
5. In this section, we use the word “objective” in its epistemologically naïve sense, as a metric of
housing outcomes that is defined according to some uniform, commonly agreed standard.
6. For more details see, http://www.shelter.org.uk/livinghomestandard.
7. See, for example, the findings from a citizen assembly on Social Care undertaken in June 2018
(https://www.involve.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/).
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